Does a renewable fuel standard for biofuels
reduce climate costs?
Mads Greakery, Michael Hoelz and Knut Einar Rosendahlx

Abstract
Recent literature on biofuels have questioned whether biofuels policies are likely to
reduce the negative e¤ects of climate change. In this paper we make two contributions
to the literature. First, we study the market e¤ects of a renewable fuel standard in a
dynamic model taking into account that oil is a non-renewable resource. Second, we
model emissions from land use change explicitly when we evaluate the climate e¤ects
of the renewable fuel standard.
We …nd that global extraction of oil is postponed as a consequence of the renewable fuel standard. Thus, if emissions from biofuels are negligible, the standard will
have bene…cial climate e¤ects. Furthermore, we …nd that the standard also tends to
reduce total fuel (i.e., oil plus biofuels) consumption initially. Hence, even if emissions from biofuels are non-negligible, a renewable fuel standard may still reduce
climate costs. In fact our simulations show that even for biofuels that are almost as
emissions-intensive as oil, a renewable fuel standard have bene…cial climate e¤ects.
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Introduction

More than 20% of energy-related CO2 emissions come from the transport sector, and
governments are therefore looking for alternatives to oil in this sector. Biofuels are currently
the most employed alternative, accounting for 2-3 percent of global transport-related energy
use (IEA, 2011a).
The advantage of biofuels is that they are relatively easy to introduce into the transport
sector. While hydrogen and battery driven cars at the moment imply both more expensive
and somewhat inferior technologies, cars that run on biofuels have approximately the same
performance as cars that run on oil, and can use the same infrastructure. The US and a
number of European countries have introduced various support schemes for deployment of
biofuels, leading to strong growth in global biofuels production and use. The support to
biofuels has not only been driven by a concern for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but
also by a concern for "energy security" in both the EU and the US.
Current support schemes involve the use of a myriad of policies. The EU has imposed
a biofuels target of 10% in 2020, and many EU countries have already introduced blending
mandates for biofuels together with excise tax rebates to biofuels and subsidies to growing
biofuels crops (Eggert, Greaker and Potter, 2011). The US has a renewable fuel standard
(RFS), which is similar to a blending mandate, in addition to various tax reliefs (Eggert,
Greaker and Potter, 2011). The complex support schemes have spurred an emerging literature analyzing the combined e¤ect of these schemes, see, e.g., DeGorter and Just (2010),
Lapan and Moschini (2010) and Eggert and Greaker (2012).
Recent contributions have also questioned whether …rst generation biofuels actually lead
to any real GHG reductions. Obvious sources of emissions from biofuels include the use
of fertilizer when growing biofuels crops (Crutzen et al, 2008), and the use of fossil energy
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in the harvesting and processing of biofuels (Macedo et al, 2008). Land use change can
lead to additional GHG emissions if the area of arable land is increased to accommodate
increasing use of biofuels. Fargione et al. (2008) introduced the concept of carbon debt,
and hold that in the worst case scenario it may take up to several hundred years to reach
climate neutrality after such conversion.
In this paper we make two contributions to the literature. With very few exceptions the
literature studying the market e¤ects of biofuels policies have treated oil as a traditional
commodity in unlimited supply. In this paper we introduce forward looking, competitive
suppliers, and we explicitly take into account that oil is a non-renewable natural resource.1
Furthermore, to our knowledge no previous studies have combined new knowledge on emissions from land use change with market e¤ects of biofuels policies, assessing the e¤ects on
climate costs, that is, the discounted sum of damage costs from climate change. This also
requires a dynamic model since policies a¤ect the time pro…les of emissions from both
sources.
There are two strands of literature that study the e¤ects of biofuels policies. One
strand studies GHG emissions from increased use of biofuels without taking into account
the interaction with the oil market. Examples of this literature are Searchinger et al
(2008) and Lapola et al. (2010). They both …nd that increased use of biofuels may lead to
increased GHG emissions due to land use change. In these analyses it is implicitly assumed
that biofuels will replace oil on a one-to-one basis (based on energy content).
The second strand of literature emphasizes that one should also analyze the market
e¤ects of biofuels policies. DeGorter and Just (2009) …nd that a renewable fuel standard
1

We do not consider market power in the oil market. This has been studied by Hochman et al. (2011)
and Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2013), who consider the e¤ects of biofuels policies taking into account
OPEC behaviour. However, both these studies use static analysis.
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may lead to a decrease in total fuel sales. This happens if the elasticity of biofuels supply
is lower than the elasticity of oil supply. The e¤ect of the policy is then not only to replace
oil with biofuels, but also to reduce total consumption of transport fuels, which by itself
will reduce climate costs. Note that this result is reversed if the elasticity of biofuels supply
is higher than the elasticity of oil supply, or if a biofuels subsidy is imposed rather than a
renewable fuel standard (DeGorter and Just, 2009).
Introducing several instruments complicates the picture even further. If a renewable
fuel standard is in place, adding a tax rebate for biofuels can only make things worse
with respect to climate costs. The subsidy then works as an implicit support to oil and,
hence, GHG emissions increase (see DeGorter and Just, 2010). Lapan and Moschini (2010)
compare a renewable fuel standard to a price based consumption subsidy, and …nd that the
former welfare dominates the latter. A renewable fuel standard is identical to a revenue
neutral combination of a tax on oil and a subsidy to biofuels (Eggert and Greaker, 2012). It
follows that a blending mandate outperforms a pure subsidy as long as there is an emission
externality.
The robustness of these results should be analyzed in a model with dynamic oil supply.
Two such examples are Crafton et al. (2012) and Chakravorty et al. (2008). On the other
hand, whereas Chakravorty et al. consider a cap on the stock of emissions and Crafton et
al. (2012) considers a subsidy to biofuels, we include a renewable fuel standard which is
used in both the EU and the US.2 Moreover, neither Crafton et al. (2012) nor Chakravorty
et al. (2008) include emissions from biofuels which seems to be crucial when assessing the
e¤ect of biofuels policies on climate costs.
First, we …nd that the extraction period of the oil resource is extended by the in2

In our paper a renewable fuel standard is identical to a blending mandate as both policies require that
biofuels constitute a given share of total fuel use in the transport sector.
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troduction of a renewable fuel standard. This happens also if only a subset of countries
introduces the standard, while the rest of the world continues without. Second, it occurs
both in the case with constant extraction cost and in the case with increasing extraction
cost. Finally, we show that a biofuels subsidy speeds up oil extraction and, hence, GHG
emissions increase, con…rming the …ndings from static models.
Given that we know the market e¤ects of a renewable fuel standard, we can also study
the e¤ects upon climate costs, taking into account the e¤ects of biofuels usage on land
use changes. A biofuels standard has two opposing e¤ects: It reduces climate costs due to
the postponement of oil extraction, but increases climate costs due to higher accumulated
emissions (because of more biofuels production that also involves emissions). In order
to evaluate the relative strengths of these e¤ects, we calibrate a numerical model of oil
extraction and demand. We …nd that even for biofuels that are almost as emissionsintensive as oil, a blending mandate may have a bene…cial climate e¤ect. The reason
is that the blending mandate reduces total fuel demand over the …rst few decades. Thus,
even though cumulative fuel demand and emissions are increased, emissions are postponed,
which reduces the discounted sum of damage costs from climate change.
Despite the bene…cial climate e¤ect, a renewable fuel standard is welfare inferior to a
tax on oil. A renewable fuel standard implies a subsidy to biofuels alongside a tax on oil.
A subsidy to biofuels is welfare reducing since there are no other externalities than the
climate externality in our model.
The paper is laid out as follows. In Section 2 we study the e¤ects of a blending mandate
in a one region model. In Section 3 we extend the model to include the two region case,
increasing cost of extraction and increasing marginal costs of biofuels. In Section 4 we
introduce climate costs from oil and biofuels, respectively. In Section 5 we provide a
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numerical illustration of the model. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude.

2

Market e¤ects of a blending mandate for biofuels

We consider a market with oil (x) and biofuels (y), which are assumed to be perfect
substitutes.3 The stock of oil (S) is …xed, and there are no costs of extracting this stock.
Unit costs of producing biofuels (b) are …xed. Then irrespective of the blending mandate,
the oil price is p(t) = p0 ert until p(T ) = b is reached at T , when a complete switch to
biofuels occurs.
The assumption that oil is given in a …xed supply with constant unit costs of extraction
might seem very restrictive. As shown by e.g. Gerlagh (2011) and Hoel (2011) the e¤ects of
a carbon tax are quite di¤erent for this case and the more realistic case in which extraction
costs increase with accumulated extraction. However, our focus in not on a carbon tax, but
on a blending mandate. Total extraction (but not the timing of extraction) is independent
of a blending mandate. This will become apparent in the next section in which we look at
the case of increasing extraction cost.
The assumption of a …xed unit cost for biofuels can also be criticized. It greatly simpli…es the analysis, and it may not be too far from reality for so-called second generation
biofuels, which to a large extent can be grown on pastures and currently unused land (IEA,
2011b). But in order to check the robustness of our results to this assumption, we consider
the case of increasing marginal cost of biofuels both analytically (next section) and in the
simulations (Section 5).
Assume that fuel consumers are required to use at least a share
total fuel use. We coin

of biofuels in the

a renewable fuel standard (RFS). Let the consumer price of fuels

3

We may think of fossil fuels as oil here, as we are interested in the transport sector and the competition
from biofuels. Thus, we implicitly abstract from oil use in other sectors, as well as other substitutes to oil
in the transport sector such as electric cars, which may become important in the future.
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be given by pC (t). We then have pC (t) = b + (1

)p0 ert . Further, let the demand for

fuel be given by D(pC ), with D0 < 0. The demand for oil and biofuels is then:

x(t) = (1

)p0 ert ) for t < T

y(t) = D( b + (1

x(t) = 0

)p0 ert ) for t < T

)D( b + (1

and

y(t) = D(b) for t

T

(1)

(2)

(3)

where T is determined by:

p0 erT = b

(4)

Finally, we have the equilibrium condition:
Z

T

x(t)dt = S

(5)

0

The endogenous variables in equations (1)-(5) are x(t), y(t), T and p0 . If p0 is known,
the whole price path is known from p(t) = p0 ert .
We are now ready to investigate how an increase in

2.1

a¤ects the market equilibrium.

E¤ects on resource extraction

First, we examine how the extraction time T and the initial resource price p0 are a¤ected
by a change in . We can show the following proposition:

7

Proposition 1 If the share of biofuels in an RFS system is increased, the oil resource will
last longer. Moreover, the intial price of the resource falls.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Obviously, the proposition also holds if we introduce an RFS, i.e., increase

from zero.

The intuition of this proposition is quite clear: If the resource price didn’t fall, demand
for oil would have to decrease in every period, which subsequently implies that there are
resources left in the ground at time T when the oil price reaches the backstop price b.
Next, we examine the e¤ects on the extraction path. We can then show:
Proposition 2 Assume that fuel demand is concave or linear. If the share of biofuels in
an RFS system is increased, extraction of oil will decline for all t < b
t, and increase for all
t>b
t.

Proof: See the Appendix.
This proposition is also quite intuitive. As the resource extraction is extended, average

extraction per period until the "old" T must come down. The proposition states that
extraction declines at every point of time until some b
t. Moreover, between the "old" and
the "new" T , extraction obviously increases.

If fuel demand is convex, we cannot rule out the possibility that initial extraction
increases. The explanation is that with convex demand, demand may be more price elastic
at low prices. Thus, if the initial consumer price (pC ) decreases in line with lower oil price
(p0 ), fuel demand may be stimulated substantially so that even demand for oil increases.

2.2

E¤ects on fuel consumption and biofuels production

In order to investigate the e¤ects on total fuel consumption, we assume that demand is a
linear function of the consumer price. We can show the following:
8

Proposition 3 Assume that fuel demand is linear. If the share of biofuels in an RFS
system is increased, the consumer price will increase (decrease) and fuel consumption will
decrease (increase) for all t < (>)b
t, where 0 < b
t < T.
Proof: See the Appendix.4

The consumer price is pulled in both directions. On the one hand, the oil price p
decreases. On the other hand, a higher

increases the weighted price pC = b + (1

)p.

According to the proposition, the latter e¤ect is dominating initially, at least if the demand
function is linear. Note that this holds whether the demand function is steep or not, as
long as the choke price pC
max

b.

When t approaches T , both the oil price and the consumer price approaches b. Thus,
for t su¢ ciently close to the "old" T , the consumer price must decrease when

is increased

(since p drops). Hence, for linear demand, total fuel consumption declines at early dates,
and increases at later dates.
The RFS is introduced to stimulate the use of biofuels. The following proposition states
how biofuels production (and consumption) is a¤ected when

is increased:

Proposition 4 If the share of biofuels in an RFS system is increased, production of biofuels will increase if either i)

is su¢ ciently small initially, ii) demand is su¢ ciently

inelastic, or iii) t is su¢ ciently close to T . On the other hand, biofuels production will
decrease initially if

is already su¢ ciently close to 1 and demand is linear and su¢ ciently

elastic.

Proof: See the Appendix.
Note that the value of t^ is generally not the same in Propositions 2, 3 and subsequent propositions
where this symbol is used.
4
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The …rst result, i.e., that biofuels production expands if at least one of three conditions is
ful…lled, is as expected. The last result, i.e., that biofuels production could in fact decrease,
may seem counter-intuitive at …rst. We know from above that the initial consumer price
increases when

is increased. If demand is very elastic, fuel consumption may then drop

quite substantially. Furthermore, if there is already a signi…cant biofuels consumption due
to a high

, it is possible that the e¤ect of demand reduction dominates the e¤ect of a

higher share of biofuels. Similar results have been found in static analysis of Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS) (or tradable green certi…cate markets), see e.g. Amundsen and
Mortensen (2001).
To summarize, we have shown that introducing or strengthening an RFS system will
lead to lower oil prices, and prolonged extraction period. If demand is concave or linear, oil
production will decrease initially, and increase in later periods so that total extraction is
unchanged. Finally, if demand is linear, the consumer price will increase initially, implying
lower initial fuel consumption, but in later periods the price will drop and fuel consumption increase. Biofuels production will most likely increase, but could decrease initially if
demand is su¢ ciently elastic and

2.3

is already high.

E¤ects of a biofuels subsidy in addition to RFS

A number of countries, including the U.S. and the EU, have or have had subsidies to biofuels
production in addition to an RFS. Such subsidies will stimulate biofuels production and
subsequently consumption, but due to the binding relationship between oil and biofuels
consumption given by the RFS, fossil consumption will also be stimulated. We can show
this formally, and have the following proposition:

Proposition 5 If a binding RFS is in place, a subsidy to biofuels production will reduce the
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extraction time for the oil resource, and increase (decrease) the use of oil for all t < (>)b
t,

where 0 < b
t < T.

Proof: See the Appendix.
Thus, introducing subsidies to biofuels production may have quite the contrary e¤ect
of what is the purpose, at least if the subsidy is introduced for environmental reasons. In
reality, such subsidies may be temporary. Nevertheless, given a binding RFS, any policy
that stimulates biofuels use will also stimulate the use of oil.

3

Extensions

As already mentioned some of our simplifying assumptions in our base case may be questioned. In this section we show that Proposition 1 still holds even if these are relaxed.
Moreover, we have considered a closed one region model. Although many countries have
implemented an RFS for biofuels, policies are not synchronized, and several large countries
such as China do not at present have any mandate at all. The question then arises whether
the results obtained so far also hold for a single region trading with other regions with no
or weaker mandates.

3.1

Stock dependent extraction costs

So far we have assumed …xed extraction costs (set to zero to simplify notation). It is more
reasonable that extraction costs depend on the remaining stock of oil. Let the cost of
extraction c be given by:

c = (S(t))x(t)

11

with

0

< 0, and where S(t) denotes the remaining stock and x(t) denotes extraction.

Extraction will stop when the marginal extraction cost reaches the price of the backstop
i.e.

(S(T )) = b in which T denotes the time at which extraction stops. The amount of

stock that will be extracted is hence given by: S = S(0)

1

(b) in which

1

is the inverse

of .
Note that S is independent of the biofuels mandate . This is an important di¤erence
between a biofuels mandate and some other climate policies. With a constant carbon tax
we get S tax = S(0)
subsidy

1

(b

), which is lower the higher is . Similarly, with a constant
1

of biofuels we get S subsidy = S(0)

(b

), which is lower the higher is . It

is well known that a biofuel mandate is equivalent to a revenue neutral combination of a
carbon tax and a subsidy on biofuel production. Since both a constant tax and a constant
subsidy give lower total extraction, we therefore might expect that also a biofuel mandate
would give lower total extraction. However, any biofuel mandate that is bounded away
from 100%, constant or time-variant, corresponds to a tax and subsidy combination with
both rates approaching zero as extraction declines towards zero. Taxes and subsidies that
approach zero as extraction approaches zero have no e¤ect on the total extraction.
As before, we have
ZT

x(t)dt = S:

(6)

0

Consider an increase in

- the biofuels share. The price of oil p(t) must then decrease,

because if not, equation (6) cannot hold. Further, at time T the price of oil must have
reached b. Hence, if the rate of change in the price of oil stays constant or decreases, the
extraction time T must increase.
The Hotelling equation for the case of stock dependent extraction costs tells us:
12

d [p(t)

(S(t))]
dt

= r [p(t)

(S(t))] + 0 (S(t))x(t)

(7)

(See for instance Crafton et al.,2012)
We rewrite (7) using S_ =

x(t) where dots over variables denote time derivatives:

p(t)
_ + 0 x(t) = rp(t)

r (S(t)) + 0 x(t)

which simpli…es to:
p(t)
_
=r 1
p(t)
If

(S(t))
p(t)

(8)

is increased at time t, and the price p(t) decreases, the rate of change in the price

must decrease ( (S(t)) does not change). Consequently, if

is increased, the extraction

time T is extended.

3.2

Increasing marginal costs of biofuels

We return to the case of zero extraction costs, but introduce increasing marginal costs of
biofuels. Let the costs of biofuels be given by c(y) with c0 > 0 and c00 > 0 (instead of c0 = b
being constant as we previously assumed). As before, when the fuel price is su¢ ciently
high biofuel production will serve all of the demand. Previously, this price p(T ) was equal
to b. With increasing marginal costs of biofuel p(T ) is determined by fuel demand being
equal to the supply of biofuels; this equilibrium can be written as c0 (D(p(T )) = p(T ).
As before, the Hotelling rule implies that the oil price is rising at the rate of interest
until oil is completely exhausted, i.e. p(t) = er(t

T)

p(T ) for t < T . Without a biofuel

mandate, we will …rst have a phase with only oil production if c0 (0) is su¢ ciently high
(so p(0) < c0 (0)). Once p(t) reaches c0 (0), biofuel production starts, and will increase over
13

time since the fuel price is rising. Total fuel demand is declining over time, and since oil
production covers the di¤erence between total demand and biofuel supply, oil production
is declining over time. This decline continues until t = T , after which biofuel production is
constant and equal to D(p(T )). Without a biofuel mandate, the main di¤erence from the
case of constant marginal costs is that the transition from oil to biofuel now is gradual,
with a phase of simultaneous production of both fuel types.
With constant marginal costs of biofuel production, a blending mandate is always
binding until oil is fully exhausted. This is not the case with increasing marginal costs
of biofuel: For any blending mandate of

there is a threshold price p such that the

mandate is not binding for p(t) > p , where p is determined by c0(

1)

(p ) = D(p ). In

words, p is the price making the unregulated supply of biofuels equal to the a share

of

total demand.5 Hence, for the period for which p(t) 2 (p ; p(T )) the biofuel mandate is
not binding, and the equilibrium is as described above.
The price path p(t) must be lower with a blending mandate than without. To see
this, consider oil demand with a mandate at the equilibrium price path when there was
no mandate. Prior to the date at which p(t) = p is reached, oil demand is lower with
the mandate than without. Hence, there would be unextracted oil at the date T at which
biofuel production covers all of the fuel demand. To restore equilibrium, the price path
p(t) therefore must decline as a response to the biofuel mandate. A lower price path for
oil also means that the exhaustion date T is postponed, just as in the case with constant
marginal costs of biofuel production.
5

Clearly, p < p(T ) since p(T ) is de…ned by c0(

1)

(p(T )) = D(p(T )).
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3.3

Two regions

With more regions one would expect carbon leakage to occur. That is, regions not tightening their RFS may increase their use of oil as a result of a stronger RFS in other regions. In
the Appendix we analyze a two region version of our model. We show that the extraction
time will be extended independent of which region that tightens its RFS, and the initial
price of oil declines. Moreover, if the demand functions in the two regions are linear, oil
extraction will decline for all t < b
t, and increase for all t > b
t (for some 0 < b
t < T ). If

one or both demand functions have second order derivatives unequal to zero, the e¤ects on
the extraction path are ambiguous. Thus, Proposition 1 carries over to the case with two
regions, while Proposition 2 only partly carries over.
The consumer price on transportation fuels in the region not changing its RFS must
fall at all dates due to the lower oil price. Hence, we will have carbon leakage as this
region will use more oil at each date due to the increased RFS rate in the other region. If
the former region also has an RFS in place, it follows that it will also increase its use of
biofuels. If fossil extraction declines in the initial periods, oil consumption in the region
with increased RFS must fall in these periods. It is more ambiguous what happens to
biofuels consumption in this region, and to oil consumption after time b
t.

Note that the our analysis of two regions also carries over to the case in which only a

part of the oil consumption is covered by the RFS e.g. the RFS covers road transport but
not gasoline and diesel used for air and sea transport. Then an increase in the blending
mandate for road transport will induce a "leakage" to air and sea transport, but all the
same, the extraction period will be prolonged.
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4

Climate costs of an RFS

We will now consider the e¤ect of the RFS on the costs of climate change. The use of oil
leads to ‡ow emissions, while emissions from use of biofuels potentially include both ‡ow
emissions and emissions from stock changes (related to land use changes). We …rst discuss
the climate costs of oil and biofuels separately, before we combine them and look at the
e¤ects of an RFS on climate costs.

4.1

Climate costs from using oil

Burning oil releases carbon to the atmosphere, which will gradually decline over time, as
it is transferred to other sinks. We model this in the "standard" way, assuming that the
carbon in the atmosphere (beyond preindustrial level) depreciates at a constant rate .6
The amount of 1 unit of carbon emissions at time t remaining in the atmosphere z years
after the emission date is thus e

z

.

At any time t, climate costs are emt C(A(t)), where A(t) is carbon in the atmosphere.
The term emt (where m

0) captures the reasonable assumption that the value of climate

damages increases over time due to income and production growth. Consider the climate
damage caused by 1 unit of emissions from burning oil at time t. The total additional
damage caused by 1 unit of carbon emissions at time t is the sum of additional damages at
all dates from t to in…nity caused by the additional stocks from t to in…nity. To get from
additional stocks at t + z to additional damages at t + z we must multiply the additional
stocks at t + z by the marginal damage at t + z, which is em(t+z) C 0 (A(t + z)). The marginal
damage of 1 additional unit of emissions at t, often denoted the social cost of carbon, is
6

This is a major simpli…cation of the properties of the the true carbon cycle. In reality, a signi…cant
portion (about 25% according to e.g. Archer, 2005) remains in the atmosphere for ever (or at least for
thousands of years). In the last part of the Appendix we show that our main results in this section remain
valid even if the carbon cycle is modeled as in Farzin and Tahvonen (1996), allowing some of the carbon
emission to remain in the atmosphere for ever.
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thus given by

mt

qx (t) = e

Z

1

e

(r+

m)z

C 0 (A(t))dz

(9)

0

For C 00 > 0 the social cost of carbon will change over time at a varying growth rate. For
the special case of C 00 = 0, i.e. that damages are linear in the atmospheric stock, (9) may
be rewritten as

qx (t) = emt

r

C0
m+

(10)

which rises over time at the constant rate m.

4.2

Climate costs from using biofuels

Growing and processing biofuels entails greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, but to what
extent is a controversial topic. According to life-cycle analyses the emission sources can
be grouped into the following categories: (I) oil usage for harvesting, transporting and
production, (II) N2 O emissions from fertilizer usage and the crop itself, (III) direct landuse change, and (IV) indirect land-use change (see e.g. Macedo et al. 2008, Khanna and
Crago, 2011).
It seems reasonable that the renewable fuel standard encompasses oil used for harvesting
and transporting in the agricultural sector. Thus, source (I) is to some degree included
in our model already.7 With respect to energy for biofuels production, this is in many
cases provided from the biofuel crop itself. For instance, sugarcane ethanol production
7

Ideally, source (I) could be incorporated into our model by taking into account that total fuel demand
is an increasing function of y(t). This could alter the extraction path of x(t), but obviously not S. As
the RFS policy implies that this extra fuel demand would be proportional to x(t), it seems unlikely that
the extraction path would be much altered either. Moreover, harvesting and transporting biofuels crops
probably make up a rather small share of total transportation fuel demand.
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often supplies electricity, too. To our knowledge such possibilities also exist for second
generation biofuels (Schmer et al., 2008).
Furthermore, according to Crutzen et al. (2008) source (II) may be signi…cant for some
kinds of …rst generation biofuels, but not so much for second generation biofuels based on
energy crops. Hence, in the following we will disregard source (I) and (II), and focus on
emissions due to land use changes, i.e., (III) and (IV). This is of course a simpli…cation,
and it is straightforward to add ‡ow emissions to the expressions below.
Emissions from direct land-use change are treated by Fargione et al. (2008). Their
study shows that converting di¤erent types of virgin land to crop land may give high
initial emissions, coined by Fargione et al. as carbon debt. Biofuels crops are however often
grown on existing agricultural land. Indirect land use change then refers to changes in land
use that occurs through changes in the market prices for food and land. Both Searchinger
et al. (2008) and Lapola et al. (2010) analyze indirect land-use change, and show that the
e¤ect upon emissions may be of great signi…cance.
In our model we treat direct land-use change and indirect land-use change together. In
particular, we assume that the global area for food crop is kept constant, and thus that a
certain production level of biofuels have led to a one time boost in emissions as the growing
of every new non-food crop must increase the total area of cultivated land globally. We
will now turn to how this can be modeled.

4.3

Climate costs from land use changes

Assume that each unit of y requires ` units of land, and that each unit of land converted
to biofuels production will reduce the carbon sequestered on this land by an amount .8
8

Note that will depend on the type of initial land and on the type of biofuels production. For some
types (barren land transformed to an energy forest) may be negative. In the subsequent discussion we
assume > 0. The parameter ` will also vary across types of biofuels. Alternatively, the biofuel crop is

18

Producing y(t) units of biofuel hence increases the amount of carbon in the atmosphere by
` units. The marginal climate cost of producing y(t) is therefore equal to `emt C 0 (A(t)).
However, there is also a climatic bene…t of the extra carbon in the atmosphere: When the
carbon stock is increased by an amount

`, there is an additional ‡ow of

` from the

atmosphere to other carbon sinks. This carbon ‡ow from the atmosphere has a value that
is equal to the social cost of carbon for ‡ows of carbon into the atmosphere, i.e. equal to
qx (t). The net marginal climate cost of producing biofuels, denoted qy (t), is therefore given
by
qy (t) = ` emt C 0 (A(t))

qx (t)

(11)

C 0 (A(t))
(r+ m)z C 0 (A(t))dz

(12)

Combining this with (9) gives

qy (t)
= ` R1
qx (t)
e
0

Notice that in the derivation above it is implicitly assumed that any increase in y will
immediately release carbon to the atmosphere. This is not an unreasonable assumption.
However, the formulation also implies that any reduction in y immediately sequesters
carbon from the atmosphere. This is obviously unrealistic; in reality, the sequestration
takes time. Hence, our formulation makes biofuels production more climate friendly than
it is in reality if we have a declining y(t).9
For the special case of C 00 = 0, i.e. that damages are linear in the atmospheric stock
grown on already developed agricultural land. We then assume that virgin land must be converted some
other place to upkeep the production of the replaced agricultural products.
9
Note that in our simulations presented in Section 5 biofuels use increases over time.
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the two equations above may be rewritten as

qy (t) = emt `

r
r

qy (t)
= `(r
qx (t)

The parameter

m
C0
m+

(13)
(14)

m)

is crucial for the e¤ect on climate costs of a RFS. If

is equal to

unity, the use of biofuels has identical climate costs to oil.

4.4

The e¤ects of an RFS on climate costs

In Section 2 we showed how the introduction of an RFS for biofuels a¤ects the time paths
for the use of oil and biofuels. The e¤ect on climate costs of the introduction of an RFS will
depend on the size of

de…ned by (14). For the limiting case of

= 0 the only e¤ect on

climate costs will be through the change in the time pro…le of oil extraction. If extraction
is delayed climate costs will go down, since e

rt

qx (t) is declining over time. By continuity,

the following proposition hence follows from Proposition 2:

Proposition 6 If

de…ned by (14) is su¢ ciently small and demand for fuel is linear

or concave, climate costs will decline as a consequence of the introduction of an RFS for
biofuels.

For larger values of

it is not obvious how climate costs are a¤ected by an RFS, even

if oil use is postponed. The reason for this is that biofuels use increases for low values
of t, but declines for higher values of t (until the date at which oil use is zero both with
and without the RFS), see Propositions 1 and 4. The isolated e¤ect of this is to increase
climate costs. There are thus two opposing e¤ects: Reduced climate costs due to the
postponement of oil extraction, and increased climate costs due to advancement in time of
20

biofuels production. Which e¤ect is strongest will depend on , and the latter e¤ect will
dominate if

is su¢ ciently large. We therefore have the following proposition:

Proposition 7 If

de…ned by (14) is su¢ ciently large, climate costs will increase as a

consequence of the introduction of an RFS for biofuels.

The e¤ects of an RFS on climate costs is hence an empirical issue. In the next section
we give some numerical estimates of the parameters determining

de…ned by (14), and

compare the e¤ects of an RFS policy with the e¤ects of an optimal tax policy.

5

Numerical illustrations

5.1

Model calibration

We calibrate the model to real world data in the following way: We consider two alternative linear fuel demand functions, with either elastic or inelastic demand. The initial
price elasticities in the two cases are respectively

0:4 and

0:1 , but the elasticities are

increasing with the price (due to linear demand). The demand functions are calibrated so
that initial fuel demand equals global oil consumption in 2011 if the initial price equals the
average crude oil price in 2011 (BP, 2012). Fuel consumption growth (for given price) is
set to 1.3% p.a., which is slightly more than what the IEA (2011a) assumes until 2035 in
combination with higher oil prices.
The stock of oil (S) is set equal to remaining global oil reserves at the end of 2011,
according to BP (2012). This may underestimate the ultimate recoverable amount of oil,
but on the other hand we will assume constant unit extraction costs. Unit costs of biofuels
are set to two times the crude oil price in 2011. Biofuels can be produced at lower costs
today, but remember that we consider biofuels as a backstop technology with unlimited
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supply at constant unit costs. We may think of this as e.g. cellulosic ethanol. The unit
costs of oil is calibrated so that the initial oil price and consumption are consistent with
the 2011 data. This leaves us with unit costs of respectively 83% and 79% of the oil price
under elastic and inelastic demand, which seems fairly reasonable.
The initial shadow cost of carbon is set to $50 per ton of CO2 , which is within the range
of CO2 prices suggested to reach ambitious climate targets (e.g., IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007;
IEA, 2011a).10 Converted to oil, the initial carbon cost (qx ) amounts to 19% of the initial
oil price. Further, we assume a discount rate of r = 4%, an income growth of m = 2%,
and a depreciation rate of

= 0:013.11

Based on the discussion above, we only consider emissions from land use change for the
climate costs of biofuels. We have found …gures for second generation biofuels of which
cellulosic ethanol based on perennial grasses seems to be the most promising (Eggert,
Greaker and Potter, 2011). From Sanderson (2006) we have that on average 0:052 hectares
of land is needed to produce 1 barrel of oil equivalent (boe) cellulosic ethanol.12 This
corresponds to the parameter ` in our theoretical model, but measured in ha/boe instead
of in ha/tonneCO2 as in the theoretical model. Emissions from oil are 0:44 tonne CO2 /boe.
The parameter ` measured in ha/tonneCO2 is hence 0:052=0:44 = 0:118.
Further, according to Plevin et al (2010) the emission factor for converted grassland is
75

200 tonne CO2 /ha. This corresponds to the variable

10

in our theoretical model. The

Ideally, the shadow cost of carbon should be based on a global cost-bene…t analysis. One prominent
example of a CBA study is the Stern Review (2007). Their …ndings suggest that the present social cost of
carbon is around $85 per ton CO2 if the world continues on the BaU path, and $25–30 if the concentration
of CO2 -equivalents stabilises between 450–550 ppm CO2 e. Most other CBA studies seem to …nd lower
shadow costs of carbon. Both these studies and the Stern Review have been much critized for various
reasons, see, e.g., Weitzman (2007, 2011) who in particular emphazises the role of uncertainty.
11
Note that in the simulation model we use the slightly more complicated climate model of Farzin and
Tahvonen (1996) in which = 0:25 denotes the amount of emitted carbon staying in the atmosphere
"forever", see Appendix.
12
For comparison, Plevin et al (2010) reports the average corn ethanol yield to be 0,07 ha/boe, while
IEA (2011b) reports the sugarcane ethanol yield to be 0,056 ha/boe.
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land use change emissions from ethanol (i.e. ` ) is hence given as 8:9
relationship qy =qx

= (r

23:6.13 For the

m)` we then get a value in the range [0:18; 0:47] (cf. (14)).

In our simulations we mainly use

= 0:33, i.e., the average of this interval. However, as

there is large variation across di¤erent biofuels, as well as signi…cant uncertainties, we will
start by considering which levels of

that make the RFS policy climate neutral (compared

to the BaU scenario).

5.2

Simulation results

How large must

be before the RFS becomes counter-productive, i.e., increases climate

costs? This could clearly depend on the stringency of the RFS policy. We consider levels
of

in the range 10

20%, which is in line with the EU targets. The answer is that

the RFS policy is climate-neutral if

is in the range 0:93

1. That is, even for biofuels

that are almost as emissions-intensive as oil, the RFS policy may have some bene…cial
climate e¤ects. The reason is that the RFS policy reduces total fuel demand over the
…rst few decades. Thus, even though cumulative fuel demand and emissions are increased,
emissions are postponed which gives a bene…cial climate e¤ect.
Second, we compare the e¤ects of the RFS policy with the e¤ects of an optimal climate
policy scenario, which in our model can be implemented by imposing a Pigovian tax on
the use of oil and biofuels. We search for the level of

that gives the same present value

of reduced climate costs as the Pigovian tax. This turns out to be

= 0:48 (0:61) in the

case with inelastic (elastic) demand, given the calibrated model as described above.14 Here
13

In our theoretical model we measure oil in units CO2 that are released by combustion. Thus, to get
the product ` in tonnes CO2 per CO2 -units of oil, we must divide our …gures with the emission factor
for oil in tonnes CO2 /boe.
14
Such large values of will of course require an enormous growth in biofuels production, which will lead
to substantial land use changes and presumably sigin…cant interactions with other parts of the economy
(e.g., agriculture). Moreover, it is not realistic that such a large production growth may take place on
short notice. Thus, this part of the numerical simulations is mainly illustrative.
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we discuss the case with inelastic demand only

the qualitative results are the same with

elastic demand.
The two policies give very di¤erent market and welfare e¤ects. Total welfare is reduced
by 6% when choosing the RFS instead of the tax, and the RFS scenario is also reducing
welfare compared to the BaU scenario.
Figure 1 Producer price of transport fuel under di¤erent scenarios
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The RFS policy is particularly detrimental for oil producers. Whereas the Pigovian tax
reduces pro…ts of these producers by 30%, pro…ts are reduced by two thirds under the RFS
policy. The initial price of oil is reduced by almost 15% in the latter case (cf. Figure 1),
which means that the initial resource rent is reduced by two thirds. In the tax scenario,
the initial oil price declines by 6%.
Figure 2 Consumer price of transport fuel under di¤erent scenarios
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Consumer surplus is somewhat lower in the tax scenario than under the RFS policy,
but not if the emission tax revenues are allocated back to the consumers. Thus, consumers
might prefer the RFS policy if they are ignorant about public revenues, which may partly
explain the popularity of blending mandates over emission taxes. On the other hand, the
initial consumer price increases much more under the RFS policy than with a tax (cf.
Figure 2), as the high level of

requires a large share of expensive biofuels. Thus, total

fuel use is reduced much more initially under the RFS than under the tax. After about 25
years, the consumer price becomes higher under the tax policy, as the consumer price is
more stable under the RFS policy due to the smaller resource rent.
Another possible explanation for the popularity of RFS might be that biofuels are
thought to be environmentally friendly, or almost climate neutral, and that a blending
mandate of

is assumed to reduce climate costs by close to %. This is clearly not the

case. In the optimal tax scenario, climate costs are reduced by 10%, while we have seen
above that a similar reduction under RFS policy requires an

of around 50%. This is

partly because emissions from biofuels are far from negligible, and partly because the RFS
policy does not reduce cumulative use of oil over time. Over the …rst 40 years, however,
25

oil production is almost halved, but the extraction period is extended from 44-45 years in
the BaU and Tax scenarios to 71 years in the RFS scenario (cf. Figure 3).
Figure 3 Fossil and biofuel production under di¤erent scenarios
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Even if the RFS policy is welfare deteriorating, it clearly reduces climate costs given
our assumed value of

= 0:33 (i.e., qy =qx = 0:33).

In Section 3 we considered a model with two regions, and discussed the e¤ects of
implementing RFS in only one of the regions. One important implication is that there
will be emissions leakage to the other region. We have simulated a model version identical
to the one above, except that we have split the demand region into two identical demand
regions. When one region imposes an RFS with 20% biofuels, and the other region has
no RFS policy, we …nd a leakage rate increasing from 12% initially to almost 35% just
before the fossil resource is fully extracted.15 Thus, global emissions are postponed, and
decline vis-a-vis BaU-levels until the "old" depletion time period T . Climate costs are also
15

These results refer to the inelastic demand function. With elastic demand, leakage is lower initially
but higher later on.
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reduced compared to BaU-levels despite leakage and an accumulated increase in emissions
over time (due to more biofuels consumption). The reduction in climate costs amounts to
1.5%, versus 3.3% if both regions implement a 20% RFS share.

5.3

Increasing marginal costs of biofuels

In the simulations above we have assumed constant biofuels costs. This is a fair assumption
for moderate levels of biofuels, such as 10-30% of the global market (cf. IEA, 2011b).
However, in our model biofuels eventually take over the whole market when the nonrenewable oil resource is extracted. Then the marginal supply costs may be signi…cantly
higher, even in the long run. However, there is little information regarding this, which
is why we have considered constant costs so far. Nevertheless, it is important to test
the sensitivity of our results with respect to this (we only consider the inelastic case here).
Thus, we have simulated the model with quadratic marginal costs of biofuels, i.e., c0 (y(t)) =
b1 + b3 (y(t))2 . We let b1 = b, i.e., the constant unit cost applied above, and calibrate b3
so that marginal costs are respectively doubled (“Moderate”) or tripled (“Strong”) when
y(t) is equal to total initial fuel demand (in BaU).16 One implication of having increasing
marginal costs of biofuels is that there will be a period when both oil and biofuels are
consumed in the BaU scenario. In both the considered cases, this period lasts from around
year 30 to around year 60.
We …nd that all our main results carry over when biofuels costs are increasing with
supply. That is, when a proportional standard of 10-20% is imposed, initial fuel demand
declines, climate costs are reduced, whereas overall welfare decreases. As before, implementing a Pigovian tax leads to even stronger reductions in climate costs; however, the
16

It then follows from the chosen functional form that marginal costs are respectively 9% and 18%
above b1 when y(t) is 30% of total initial fuel demand. Hence, biofuels costs increase only gradually given
moderate levels of biofuels (cf. the reference to IEA above).
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level of

that gives the same climate costs as the Pigovian tax decreases from 0.48 to 0.37

in both cases considered here. The explanation is that with higher costs of biofuels, total
fuel demand is hit even harder when

is increased.

Our benchmark assumption regarding emissions of biofuels is

= 0:32. With constant

biofuels costs, we concluded above that the RFS policy would be climate-neutral if
in the range 0:93
policy with

is

1. With increasing marginal costs of biofuels, we …nd that an RFS

= 20% is climate-neutral if

= 0:74 (“Moderate”) and

= 0:69 (“Strong”),

respectively. The explanation is that higher biofuels costs postpone the extraction of nonrenewable oil in the BaU scenario - hence, the additional postponement implied by the
RFS policy has less importance than under a constant biofuels cost. Thus, emissions from
biofuels cannot be too high if the RFS policy is to reduce climate costs.

6

Discussion and conclusion

We have found that the extraction period of the oil resource is extended by the introduction
of a renewable fuel standard. This happens even if only a subset of countries introduces
a renewable fuel standard, while the rest of the world continues without. Extraction of
oil will then likely decline initially. Furthermore, even for biofuels that are almost as
emissions-intensive as oil, a standard may then reduce climate costs. The reason is that it
tends to reduce total fuel consumption over the …rst decades.
Note, however, that despite the bene…cial climate e¤ect, a renewable fuel standard
always reduces total welfare in our numerical model runs. A renewable fuel standard
implies a subsidy to biofuels alongside a tax on oil. A subsidy to biofuels hampers welfare
in our model since there are no other externalities than the climate externality.
In our base case we treat biofuels as a backstop technology with constant unit costs.
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As shown by Chakravorty et al.(2008), this is a reasonable assumption as long as land is
abundant. IEA (2011b) predicts that biofuels may provide 27% of total transport fuel in
2050. Biofuels crops must then increase from 2% of total arable land today to around 6%
in 2050. Much of this increase, however, will take place on pastures and currently unused
land, which is suitable for second generation biofuels. Furthermore, Schmer et al. (2008)
conjecture that large improvements in both genetics and agroeconomies will increase yields
dramatically. Thus, the rate of technological progress within second generation biofuels
could overcome the problem with land scarcity.
In our base case we also assume that biofuels can fully replace oil when all oil is
extracted. Whether a total replacement of oil is possible at reasonable costs seems to
depend on the rate of technological development, for instance, if the experiments with
algae based biofuels will be successful (IEA, 2011b).
Our paper should be seen as a …rst attempt to include both dynamic optimization
and emission from land use change when looking at biofuels policies. Later contributions
should consider replacing the constant unit cost of biofuels assumption with more realistic
biofuels supply schedules, among other taking into account that land quality may vary.
One would then also likely let the carbon sequestered on the converted land vary with
total production.
Our study has focused on the transport sector, and implicitly disregarded oil used in
other sectors. Thus, future research should also consider incorporating fuel demand in
other sectors. Our analysis of the two region model can in fact be alternatively interpreted
as a simple representation of a two sector model, where Region 2 represents demand in
non-transport sectors where the RFS policy does not apply. The numerical results above
then indicate that the climate costs of the RFS policy will still be reduced, especially as
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the higher use of oil in Region 2 will lead to less use of other energy goods.
In the analysis above we have considered a time invariant blending mandate. It could
be argued that a more realistic scenario would be to introduce a gradually increasing
share of biofuels, i.e., that

is increasing over time. If so, fossil producers could …nd it

pro…table to enhance their initial extraction as future policies are (expected to be) even
more detrimental to them than current policies. We have brie‡y tested this in our numerical
model, considering linear increases in the blending rate.17 The simulations suggest that
initial extraction and emissions (including those from biofuels) tend to increase if demand
is elastic, but decrease if demand is inelastic. Accumulated climate costs decline in all
our simulations, given our benchmark assumptions. Thus, using the terminology used by
Gerlagh (2011), there may be a weak green paradox if a blending mandate is gradually
introduced (if demand is su¢ ciently elastic), but probably not a strong green paradox.
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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1:
We …rst di¤erentiate (4) with respect to :

dT
dp0
dp0 rT
e + rp0 erT
=0,
=
d
d
d
Next, we insert from (1) into (5) and di¤erentiate:
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This further gives:
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Hence, we have proved the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We di¤erentiate x(t) with respect to :
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The …rst term is negative, whereas the last term can be either positive or negative.
Notice that the bracket in front of D0 (pC (t)) decreases over time. If the bracket is positive
at t = 0, we obviously have that the whole expression is negative, i.e., x(0) decreases
when

increases. If the bracket is negative at t = 0 (and thus for all t), the bracket will

increase in absolute value over time. If the demand function is concave, i.e., D00 (pC (t))

0,

then D0 (pC (t)) will also increase in absolute value over time (since pC (t) increases over
time). Thus, the second term will increase over time, and so will the …rst term, too.
Hence, dx(t)=d will increase over time. But then we must have dx(0)=d < 0 - otherwise
accumulated resource extraction over time will increase, which is not possible. Moreover,
if the demand function is concave, it follows that fossil extraction will decline for all t < b
t
and increase for all t > b
t (for some 0 < b
t

T ).

Proof of Proposition 3:

We di¤erentiate pC (t) with respect to :

dpC (t)
=b
d
We notice that

dpC (t)
d

rt

p0 e + (1

rp0
S
)e
2
(1
) D(b)
rt

(1
(1

)2
)rp0

is decreasing over time. We also know that

(19)
dpC (t)
d

su¢ ciently close to T , since T increases with . Thus, if we can show that
have proved the proposition.
With linear demand we have:
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< 0 for t

dpC (0)
d

> 0, we

1
(1
r

= T

e

rT

0

0

= 1r (erT

) bD and

1)D .

Thus, we get:

dpC (0)
= p0 erT
d

1

r

S
D(b)(1

(1
)2
) (1
)2 rp0

(20)

Next, we derive the following expression for S, where we use that D(pC ) = D

0

C
pC
max + p

C
(pC
max is the choke price, i.e., D(pmax ) = 0):

Z

Z

T

T

)p0 ert )dt

x(t)dt = (1
)
D( b + (1
0
0
Z T
0
= (1
)D
pC
b + (1
max +

S=

)p0 ert

dt

0

)D

= (1

0

pC
max T + bT + (1

We insert this and the expressions for

dpC (0)
= p0 [erT
d
(1
r

b
1
r

rT

e

(21)

0

into (20) (note that D(b) = D (b pC
max )):

1
)D

"

= p0 erT
= p0

and

)

b + (1

0

pC
max T + bT + (1
0

D (b
1

pC
max )(1

) rb 1
)

e

r

)be

rT

=

p0
b

+ (1
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)e

(1

)2 rp0 1r (erT

(1

pC
) rb 1 e
max T + bT + (1
(b pC
(1
max )
pC
max

rT

rT

rT

(1
)b(1

pC
max
b

)2 T
1)D

) T
rT
e )

1
(1
r

e

rT

) bD

0
1
(1
r

e

rT

) b

0

]

#
(22)

where

= berT + (1
+(1
=b

rT
pC
max e

)b

)be

rT

+ (1

pC
max
rT + 1
b

b

rT + 1

= b (1

)

)brT

erT +

erT +

b

erT

(1

1

)be

1

C
+ pC
max + pmax rT

+ rT

1

Here we have used that pC
max > b and 2rT + e

) e

) e

rT

rT

+ rT

= b (1

rT

brT

(1

)b

rT

)be

rT + (1

rT + (1
rT

rT

)b + (1

erT

erT + e

rT + 1

(1

+ rT

1

1

) 2rT

erT + e

rT

<0

erT < 0 for any rT . We see that

the denominator in (22) is negative. Hence, we have shown that the whole expression is
positive for any pC
max > b, so that

dpC (0)
d

> 0.

Proof of Proposition 4:
We di¤erentiate y(t) with respect to :

dy(t)
= D(pC (t)) +
d

b

p0 ert + (1

= D(pC (t)) +

b

p0 ert D0 (pC (t))

)ert

dp0
d

D0 (pC (t))

rp0 ert

(1

S (1
)2
D0 (pC(23)
(t))
)D(b) (1
)2 rp0

The …rst term is positive. The second and third terms are zero if either
D0 = 0. Thus, if

= 0 or

is su¢ ciently low initially, or if demand is su¢ ciently inelastic, y(t) will

increase. Furhermore, if t is su¢ ciently close to T , we know from above that the consumer
price falls, implying that y(t) must increase. Hence, we have shown the …rst part of the
proposition.
Next, let us show that y(0) decreases if demand is linear and su¢ ciently elastic, and
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is su¢ ciently large initially. We use the derivations in (22), and insert for
D(pC ) = D

0

and

C
pC
. Then we get:
max + p

dy(t)
0
)p0 ert + b
p0 ert
= D [ pC
max + b + (1
d
pC
) rb 1 e
max T + bT + (1
rt
rp0 e
(b pC
(1
max )
0

= D [ pC
max + 2 b + (1
r(t T )

be

If we let

,

2 )ber(t

rT

(1
)b(1

) T
e rT )

1
(1
r

e

rT

) b

]

T)

pC
(1
) rT 2(1
max rT + brT
pC
)be rT
max + b + (1

e

rT

) b

]

(24)

go towards one, we get:

dy(t)
0
!D
d

pC
max + 2b

ber(t

T)

(1 + rT )

(25)

If pC
max is su¢ ciently close to b, we see that the bracket is positive for t = 0, and hence
dy(0)
d

is negative.

Proof of Proposition 5:
Introducing (or increasing) a unit subsidy to biofuels production has the same market
e¤ect as reducing the size of b. Thus, we examine the e¤ects of changing b. Following the
same procedure as in the proof of Proposition 1, we get:

dT
=
db

Z

T

D0 (pC (t))dt

0

D(b)

(1

)rp0

>0

Thus, T decreases when b declines, or when a subsidy is introduced.
Next, di¤erentiating (1) with respect to b, we get:
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(26)

dx(t)
= (1
db

)D0 (pC (t))

(1

) rp0

dp0 rt
e
db

(27)

The only variable that changes over time is ert . Thus, the paranthesis must decrease
over time. We know that if x(t) increases for some t, it must decrease at some other time
(since S is …xed). Hence, there must be a b
t where the paranthesis is equal to zero. Then
we have that the whole expression must be negative for all t < b
t and positive for all t > b
t.

In other words, a subsidy to biofuels increases (decreases) oil consumption and extraction
for all t < (>)b
t.

The case of two regions
The RFS rate is now region-speci…c,

i.

Equations (1)-(3), as well as the consumer price,

are also then region-speci…c, while (4) is unchanged. Let S1 and S2 denote accumulated
Z T
Z T
resource use in the two regions, i.e., S1 =
x1 (t)dt and S2 =
x2 (t)dt. We then have:
0

0

(28)

S1 + S2 = S

We are now ready to look at the e¤ects of an increase in

i.

We insert from (1) into

(5), and then into (28):

X

i

Z T
Di ( i b + (1
i)

(1

0

T

Di (pC
i (t))dt+(1

=S

0

and di¤erentiate with respect to

Z

rt
i )p0 e )dt

Z
i)

i

T

b

p0 ert + (1

0
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rt dp0
i )e
d i

Di0 (pC
i (t))dt+(1

i )Di (b)

dT
+
d i

Z T
(1
j)

(1

rt dp0 0
D (pC (t))dt
j )e
d i j j

0

Inserting for

dp0
d

Z
i)

T

Di (pC
i (t))dt

+ (1

0

(1

i )Di (b)

j )Dj (b)

dT
=0
d i

from (15), which still holds but is region-speci…c, gives:
Z

0=

+ (1

T

b

p0 ert Di0 (pC
i (t)) dt+

0

+ (1

j )Dj (b)

2

(1

i)

rp0

Z

Z T
dT
ert Dj0 (pC
j)
j (t))dt
d i
0

T
rt

e

Di0 (pC (t))dt

rp0 (1

0

which can be rearranged:

dT
1
=
d i
1
where
0 and

j

i

= (1

= rp0 (1

2

i)

Z

i

Si
i )Di (b) + (1

(1

i
i

j

= (1

2

T

(b

rt

p0 e

) Di0 (pC
i (t))

dt < 0,

Z0 T
ert Dj0 (pC
j)
j (t))dt < 0. Note that

i

(29)

>0

j )Dj (b)

i)

rp0

Z

T

ert Di0 (pC
i (t))dt <

0

i,

i

and can all be treated as

0

C
constants (given the new paths for pC
i (t) and pj (t) and the new T ). Since

it follows that

dp0
d

dp0
d i

=

rp0 ddTi ,

< 0.

For the change in total oil extraction we have:

dxi (t) dxj (t)
+
= Di (pC
i (t)) + (1
d i
d i
+ (1

0 C
i )Di (pi (t))(b

2 0 C
i ) Di (pi (t))

+ (1

p0 ert )

2 0
C
j ) Dj (pj (t))

ert

dp0
d i

(30)

The two …rst terms are negative: Increasing the RFS decreases the use of oil for a given
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consumer price on transportation fuel and increases the consumer price on transporation
fuel for a given price on oil. On the other hand, the last term is positive as the price
on oil falls, having a downward e¤ect on the consumer price in both regions. We know
that extraction must increase at some point since extraction now last longer. It must then
decline at other points since the amount of resource is given. To see what happens at t = 0,
we rearrange (30) we obtain the following expression for

Di (pC
i (t))

+(1

i)

b

2 0
C
rt
j ) Dj (pj (t))p0 e

r(1

p0 ert

rp0 ert

(1

(1

Si
i )Di (b) + (1

dxi (t)
d i

+

dxj (t)
:
d i

Si
i )Di (b) + (1

i
j )Dj (b)

i
j )Dj (b)

i

j

i

j

Di0 (pC
i (t))

(31)

The …rst term is negative, and will become less negative over time since the consumerprice on transportation fuel pC
i (t) must increase over time. The next term is positive, and
it must increases over time as long as the demand function is concave, i.e., Dj00 (pC (t))

0.

Hence, if the sum of the …rst and the second term is positive, the sum will stay positive
and increase in value for all t until T .
The bracket in the last term decreases over time. If the bracket is negative at t = 0,
the whole term is positive intially. Moreover, it will become more and more positive over
time as long as Di00 (pC (t))

0. If the bracket is positive at t = 0, the whole term is

negative initially. At some time t < T the bracket will become negative, and then the
second term will become more and more positive over time as long as Di00 (pC (t))

0. In

the time interval [0; ti the terms in brackets will decrease towards zero, while the derivative
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00 C
Di0 (pC
i (t)) will stay constant or become more negative (as long as Di (p (t))

0).

There are only two ways in which the whole expression in (31) can be positive for t = 0.
The sum of the …rst and second term can be positive and the last term can be positive.
However, then the whole expression will stay positive for all t < T . This is inconsistent
with the fact that extraction time increases. Thus, this case can be ruled out.
The last term could be negative, but still the whole expression could be positive for
t = 0. This implies that the sum of the …rst and second term is positive initially, and
that this sum is larger than the absolute value of the second term. However, we know
that the sum of the …rst and second term is increasing in t. Hence, in order for the whole
expression to become negative at some point, the second term must become more negative.
This cannot happen if Di00 (pC (t)) = 0. Hence, it follows that if Di00 (pC (t)) = 0, total fossil
extraction will decline for all t < b
t and increase for all t > b
t (for some 0 < b
t < T ). For the
other cases

dxi (0)
d i

+

dxj (0)
d i

is ambiguous.

For the e¤ects on the consumer price pC
i (t) in Region i we have:

@pC
i (t)
=b
@ i

p0 ert + (1

rt dp0
i )e
d i

Note that the sum of the two …rst terms are positive (for t < T ), while the last term
is negative. We know that

dpC (t)
d

< 0 for t su¢ ciently close to T , since T increases with .

What about the e¤ect at t = 0? Using that

dp0
d i
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=

rp0 ddTi and that p0 = be

rT

we have:

@pC
i (0)
=b 1
@ i

e

rT

=b 1

e

rT

>b 1

e

rT

rT e
re
re

rT

(1

i)

T

rT

(1
rT

(1

dT
d i

Si
i
)D
(b)
+
(1
i
i
j )Dj (b)
Si
i
> 0;
)D
(b)
i
i
i

i

j

where we use the …ndings for one region in Section 1.4 (cf. (20)) in the last inequality.
Hence, total fuel consumption in Region i declines initially. Initial consumption of oil in
this region must then also decline.
For the region not changing its blending mandate, we have:

@pC
j (t)
= (1
@ i

rt dp0
j )e
d i

<0

It follows that Region j will use more of the resource at all times. Thus, we have:
dSj
d i

> 0 and

given that

j

dSi
d i

< 0. It also follows that Region j will use more biofuels in each period,

> 0.

A more realistic carbon cycle
The carbon in the atmosphere at any time t is arti…cially split into two components
A1 (t) + A2 (t): component 1 that remains in the atmosphere for ever and component 2
that gradually depreciates at a rate . For each unit emitted the share that remains in
the atmosphere for ever is denoted . The amount of 1 unit of carbon emissions at time t
remaining in the atmosphere z years after the emission date is thus + (1
= 0:013 and

)e

z

. If e.g.

= 0:25, 45 % of the original emissions will remain in the atmosphere after

100 years, while 27 % still remains after 300 years. These numbers are roughly in line with
what is suggested by Archer (2005) and others.
43

Consider the following simple optimization problem, where the resource constraint is
ignored:
max

Z

1

e

rt

[F (x(t); y(t)

C(A1 (t) + A2 (t)] dt

(32)

0

where x and y stand for oil use and biofuel use, respectively. The net bene…t (ignoring
climate e¤ects) function F is strictly increasing and concave, and the climate cost function
C has the properties C 0 > 0 and C 00

0. Total carbon in the atmosphere is given by

A1 + A2 , and is a state variable in the optimization problem.
We assume that x can be chosen freely at any time. In order to avoid jumps in the
state variables, we assume y is a state variable developing according to

y(t)
_ = u(t) where u(t) 2 [ u; u]

Any change in y must thus occur via the control variable u di¤ering from zero. We
assume u is large, so that jumps in y are "almost possible".
Previously, we assumed that any jump in y was associated with a corresponding jump
on the amount of carbon in the atmosphere. Now any change in y will be captured by the
change in the atmosphere being gradual and proportional to u:

A_ 1 (t) = [x(t) + ` u(t)]
A_ 2 (t) = (1

) [x(t) + ` u(t)]

A2 (t)

Before proceeding, it is useful to consider the development of carbon in the atmosphere
when x and y are constant equal to x and y . In this case the long-run equilibrium is
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characterized by u = 0 and A2 constant equal to

1

A2 =

x

while A1 (t) will be given by
Z

A1 (t) = A1 (0) +

t

x(t)dt + ` (y

y(0))

0

Hence,
A(t) = A1 (0) +

1

Z

x +

t

x(t)dt + ` (y

y(0))

0

which will be growing over time unless x = 0. If x = 0, A will be higher the higher is
the level of biofuel production.
Returning to the maximization problem (32), the current value Hamiltonian is (formulated with positive costate variables and ignoring time references)

H = F (x; y)
+ u

C(A1 + A2 )
1

[x(t) + ` u(t)]

f(1

2

) [x(t) + ` u(t)]

A2 (t)g

The optimal solution must satisfy

Fx (x(t); y(t))

(t)

` [

[

1 (t)

1 (t)

+ (1

) 2 (t)] = 0 for x(t) > 0

(33)

) 2 (t)] = 0 for u(t) 2 ( u; u)

(34)

+ (1

_ (t) = r (t)

Fy (x(t); y(t))
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(35)

_ 1 (t) = r 1 (t) + C 0 (A1 (t) + A2 (t))

(36)

_ 2 (t) = (r + ) 2 (t) + C 0 (A1 (t) + A2 (t))

(37)

Limt!1 e

Limt!1 e

rt

rt

(t)y(t) = 0

i (t)Ai (t)

= 0 i = 1; 2

(38)

(39)

The equations above imply that

(t) =

Z

1

e

rz

Fy (x(t + z); y(t + z))dz

(40)

0

1 (t)

+ (1

) 2 (t) = qx (t) given by (9)

For an interior solution at any time when y does not "jump" we thus have

Fx (x(t); y(t)) = qx (t)
(t) = ` qx (t)

(41)
(42)

There is not much one can say about the ratio Fy =Fx for the general case of C 00 > 0.
We therefore restrict ourselves to the special case of the equilibrium value of C 0 rising at
a constant rate m 2 [0; r). One interpretation of the case m > 0 was given in Section 3.
A second interpretation could be that the functions in the optimization problem are such
that the solution gives a constant growth rate of C 0 .
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Inserting C 0 = C00 emt into (9) gives

qx (t) =

r

m

+

1
r+

m

C00 emt

(43)

From (42) it follows that (t) must grow at the rate m, and from (40) this implies that Fy
grows at the rate m and that
(t) =

Fy (x(t); y(t))
r m

Together with (42) we thus get

Fy (x(t); y(t))

qy (t) = (r

and hence
qy (t)
= (r
qx (t)
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m)`

m)` qx (t)

